Mr. President, I rise

today in support of H.R. 1883, the Iran

Nonproliferation Act of 1999.

As chairman of the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence, I am in a

privileged position to have access to

the volumes of intelligence information

gathered at great expense and

even risk of life by our intelligence

community.

Sadly, this intelligence leads me to

the conclusion that our efforts thus far

to stem proliferation have failed. As

the Director of Central Intelligence

told me in an open Hearing before the

Senate Intelligence Committee just

this month:

Particularly in the case of Iran, the

intelligence indicates that the proliferation

of missile technologies as

well as the technologies and expertise

to enable their development of chemical,

biological, and nuclear weapons,

continues unabated.

Our nonproliferation efforts haven’t

failed because we haven’t tried other

things. They have failed because the

tools we have used thus far have not

been up to the task.

The task is indeed formidable.

Iran desperately wants these weapons.

We wish they didn’t. We wish the

problem would go away on its own. But

the evidence indicates that it won’t. In

the unclassified version of a report submitted

to me on January 21st pursuant

to a mandate in the Intelligence Authorization

Act of 1997—a report available

to all Members—the Director of

Central Intelligence stated:

With regard to missile proliferation,

in his testimony to me this month, the

DCI reported that:

And, he added, Iran could become not

just a recipient, but a proliferator:

Iran is not just seeking missiles, but

also biological, chemical, and nuclear

weapons. Iran is seeking dual-use technologies

to further the biological warfare

program it began during the Iran-

Iraq war. Iran also wants to maintain a

prohibited chemical weapons capability.

According to the January DCI

report I just mentioned, Iran, despite

its commitment to give up chemical

weapons under the Chemical Weapons

Convention, ‘‘has manufactured and

stockpiled chemical weapons, including

blister, blood, and choking agents and

the bombs and artillery shells for delivering

them.’’ They have continued

to ‘‘seek production technology, expertise,

and chemicals that could be used

as precursor agents in its chemical

warfare program from entities in Russia

and China.’’ Finally, Iran wants a

nuclear weapons capability. According

to the DCI: ‘‘Iran sought nuclear-related

equipment, material and technical

expertise from a variety of

sources, especially in Russia, during

the first half of 1999.’’

Importantly, Iran is seeking an indigenous

capability. Their pursuit of

WMD and delivery systems has lead to

a maturing indigenous capability. This

means that the window in which we

can stop significant proliferation to

Iran is closing rapidly. This means that

the time to intervene is now.

Some have suggested that the recent

elections in Iran should lead us to

pause our consideration of this bill. I

disagree. First, to the degree that the

newly elected Iranian legislators seek

to constrain efforts to develop and deploy

weapons of mass destruction, I believe

that this legislation will

strengthen such an effort. It demonstrates

the seriousness with which

the United States Congress views proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction.

Second, existing evidence indicates

that we cannot count on the elections

to bring an end to Iran’s national

policy of developing weapons of mass

destruction and their means of delivery.

It is important to underscore that

former President Rafsanjani, considered

a moderate in Iranian political

circles, was the very leader who initiated

Iran’s pursuit of those weapons.

Indeed it was Rafsanjani who said that

‘‘Chemical and biological weapons are

poor man’s atomic bombs . . .’’ After

he became Iran’s President, he is

quoted as saying: ‘‘We should fully

equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive

use of chemical, bacteriological

and radiological weapons.’’ We cannot

expect that Iran will therefore give up

its pursuit of these weapons on their

own. This bill will provide additional

incentive for them to do so, and we will

watch carefully for evidence of such a

decision, but at this point, absent

strong policy on our part, we must conclude

that the policy of acquiring these

weapons and their means of delivery

will continue.

The task of stemming proliferation

to Iran is made more difficult because

individuals and the nations from which

they proliferate have their own strong

motives for aiding Iran. For some individuals,

the motive is money. But why

can’t we simply rely on the governments

in which they operate to stop

them? In some cases, governments are

too week to intervene. In others, the

government looks the other way or

even promotes proliferation to Iran because

their leaders welcome the challenge

an Iran with missiles and weapons

of mass destruction poses to the

United States.

We need the tools to offset the benefits

of aiding Iran. We must ensure that

there are financial and other costs associated

with supplying the assistance

Iran still needs in its drive for weapons

of mass destruction and missiles.

H.R. 1883 gives the United States

tools to attack proliferation on the

supply side.

The first tool is the light of exposure

to scrutiny. H.R. 1883 requires the

President to submit annual reports

identifying every person that, on or

after January 1, 1999, transfers to Iran

goods, services or technology on existing

control lists or items with the potential

to make a material contribution

to Iran’s development of nuclear,

biological, or chemical weapons or ballistic

or cruise missile systems. As a

result, the Congress, the American people,

and the community of nations will

know who is supporting Iran’s efforts

to threaten peace and stability. We will

shine a light on those lining their bank

accounts by selling the tools of hideous

death and unimaginable destruction to

Iran. The threat of public exposure

should serve as a significant deterrent

to those who contemplate proliferation

to Iran.

The second tool offered by H.R. 1883

is the authorization for the President

to deny perpetrators of proliferation

access to some U.S. trade. I highlight

the word ‘‘authorization.’’ The sanctions

provided by H.R. 1883 are not

mandatory and exceptions are granted.

These tools, properly employed, will

help stem the tide of proliferation to

Iran. Are there costs? Yes. Some U.S.

businesses may be called upon by the

President to refrain from commerce

with individuals that are shown to be

materially aiding Iran’s weapons of

mass destruction and missile programs.

But such a potential cost seems reasonable

to me in light of the potentially

far greater cost if we fail to act—the

lives of American men, women, and

children.

I urge my colleagues to join me in

supporting H.R. 1883 in a bipartisan

way, as our House colleagues did when

they voted to pass H.R. 1883 by a vote

of 419-zero.